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On October 23, 2002, a notice of appearance was filed by Rolf Kehne (R.,
pp.42-43), and on October 25, 2002, the public defender filed a notice of
substitution of counsel, indicating that Rolf Kehne would replace the public
defender as Eby's counsel (R., pp.44-45).
On April 30, 2003, the district court again issued a notice of its proposed
dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c).

(R., p.46.)

A notation on the notice

indicates that the notice was sent to an incorrect address for Eby's counsel. (R.,
p.46.) On May 27, 2003, the district court reissued a notice of its proposed
dismissal of Eby's petition pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c), sending copies of the
notice to Eby's counsel, Rolf Kehne, and to the public defender originally
assigned to the case. (R., pp.47-48.) By its notice, the district court gave Eby
until June 16, 2003 to file an affidavit "setting forth specific facts justifying
retention and setting forth a specific time table for actions necessary to make the
case ready for trial ...." (R., pp.47-48.) On June 16, 2003, Eby's counsel filed a
response and affidavit, representing that an amended petition would be filed on
September 15, 2003. (R., pp.49-58.) Apparently satisfied that the case would
be moving forward, on June 18, 2003, the district court issued an order retaining
the case. (R., p.59.)
On December 15, 2003, the district court issued a notice of its proposed
dismissal of the case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c), as nothing had been filed with
the court since its June 18 order retaining the case. (R., pp.60-61.) The notice
gave Eby until January 2, 2004 to file an affidavit justifying retention of the case.
(R., pp.60-61.)

(R., p.92), and assures the court that "[aln Amended Petition will be filed on or
before Friday the 4th of March, 2005, or a sworn declaration explaining why it
was not ... will be filed by that date" (R., p.92).
An amended petition was not filed by March 4, 2005, nor was "a sworn
declaration explaining why it was not" filed, nor was anything at all filed in the
case until June 14,2005.
On June 14, 2005, the district court dismissed the case pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 40(c), "Dismissal of Inactive Cases". (R., p.97.)
On September 6, 2005, Eby himself moved the district court to "review" its
decision to dismiss his case, noting that he had "submitted a letter requesting
Review of Order of Dismissal" on August 17, 2005. (R., pp.98-109.) On October
3, 2005, Eby filed a motion for appointment of new counsel. (R., pp.111-I 19.)
On November 17, 2005, the district court appointed new counsel to
represent Eby.

(R., p.120.)

On March 7, 2006, a notice of substitution of

counsel was filed, indicating that the public defender had conflicted Eby's case to
Linda Payne. (R., pp.121-122.)
Eby's new counsel filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief on
August 22, 2006.

(R., pp.127-128.)

The state objected to the filing of the

amended petition on the grounds that the case had been dismissed on June 14,
2005. (R., p.133.)
On April 9, 2007, Eby's counsel moved the court to set aside the June 14,
2005 order dismissing his case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c), on the grounds that
his earlier post-conviction counsel had been ineffective. (R., pp.148-149.) The

ISSUES
Eby states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err in failing to set aside the order of
dismissal?

2.

On remand, should new competent counsel be appointed?

(Appellant's brief, p.17.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
Nearly three months after the district court dismissed his post-conviction case,
Eby, although represented by counsel, filed a pro se motion asking the court to
"review" its decision to dismiss and to appoint him new counsel. Nearly two
years after the district court dismissed the case, new counsel filed a motion to
set aside the order of dismissal. Has Eby failed to establish that the district court
committed reversible error when it denied Eby's motion to set aside its final
order?

Eby's motion was filed 84 days after the order was entered and 42 days after the
time for filing an appeal had passed. Eby thereafter moved for new counsel,
who explicitly moved to set aside the order, but without citing any rules of civil
procedure in support, nearly 21 months after the order became final. As the
district court correctly found, pursuant to Castle v. Havs, 131 ldaho 373, 957
P.2d 351 (1998), it was without authority to set aside its order and reinstate the
case after the 42 day period for filing an appeal had elapsed. (Tr., p.21, L.15 -

In Castle, the ldaho Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue raised
by Eby's motions

- whether a district court has authority to set aside its order,

pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c), dismissing a case for inactivity after the time for filing
an appeal from that order has passed. In that case, the district court dismissed a
case pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40(c). Seventy-seven days later, plaintiffs counsel
"filed a motion to reinstate the action."

Castle, 131 ldaho at

373, 957 P.2d at

351. The district court granted the motion, and but later granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). On appeal from that
order, the Court held the district court did not have authority to reinstate the case
after dismissal:
It has long been recognized that a formal order dismissing
an action is in effect a final judgment that puts an end to the suit.
Marshall v. Enns, 39 ldaho 744, 230 P. 46 (1924). Relief from
such an order is limited. A party who disagrees with such an order
may, within fourteen days, seek reconsideration in the trial court
under I.R.C.P. 1I(a)(Z)(B), or the party may file an appeal within
forty-two days to obtain appellate review of the dismissal order as
provided in ldaho Appellate Rule Il(a)(l). See e.g., Donaldson v.
Buckner, 66 ldaho 183, 157 P.2d 84 (1945). As a corollary, a
timely motion for reconsideration tolls the time for filing an appeal

when it so ruled, he simply disagrees with the ruling because Eby's counsel was
obviously incompetent. (Appellant's brief, p.23.) However, the fact that counsel
on post-conviction relief is incompetent does not require the suspension of the
rules of civil procedure nor does it automatically afford a litigant the relief he
seeks. See Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191, 177 P.3d 400,405 (Ct. App.
2008). Eby's pro se motion to "review" the order dismissing his case cannot be
construed as "a timely motion under Rule 60(b)" simply because he asks, three
years later, that it be construed as such. (Appellant's brief, p.23.) Eby has failed
to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it found that Eby's
circumstances did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 60(b).
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Eby's motion to set aside the order dismissing his case.
DATED this 1st day of December, 2
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Rebekah A. Cude
Deputy Attorney General

